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Defining “Fiduciary”
ALIGNING OBLIGATIONS WITH EXPECTATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Half of Americans saving for retirement report feeling
“not confident” or only “slightly confident” that they will make
good investment decisions in managing their 401(k) plans,
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and other savings
accounts.1 And the stakes are high: poor investment decisions
rob many Americans of the worry-free retirement for which
they had desperately planned. Even the 40% of retirement
savers who receive investment advice from a professional2 may
make poor investment decisions. Contrary to what one may
think, professional investment advice is not always trustworthy.
Some retirement investment advisers receive commission for
recommending certain investments, which encourages them to
recommend products that generate more income for themselves
rather than products that would most benefit the investors.3 The
White House Council of Economic Advisers estimated that IRA
investors place $1.7 trillion into commission-generating products
each year.4 This practice was legal under the former language of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
which governs who is considered a “fiduciary” of an employee
benefit plan.5 For an investment adviser to be the investor’s
fiduciary, the adviser must (1) give advice (2) on a regular basis (3)
under a mutual understanding (4) that the advice is
individualized and (5) will be the primary basis for investment
1 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015, at 63 (2016).
2 Id.
3 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928, 21,930 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509–10) [hereinafter Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal].
4 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT
ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (2015) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED
INVESTMENT ADVICE], https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo55500/cea_coi_report_final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YC8V-4Y6Z].
5 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 3(21)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2012)).
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decisions.6 An adviser must meet all five requirements in order
to be considered an investor’s fiduciary.7 Under this rigorous
test, many advisers, whose clients think they are fiduciaries
and who should be considered fiduciaries, do not have legal
fiduciary obligations. This narrow definition creates a problem
because it leaves retirement investors vulnerable to manipulation
and exploitation by their advisers. The definition of fiduciary is
important because individuals who qualify as fiduciaries must
provide only advice that is in the investor’s best interest.8
Advisers who fall outside of this definition, on the other hand,
may provide suitable advice and recommendations outside of the
investor’s best interest.9
According to a report by the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers, receiving conflicted advice, or advice given
by an adviser whose profit depends on the investor’s decisions,10
causes retirees to run out of savings five years earlier than if
they had not received such advice.11 To combat these “direct and
substantial conflicts of interest,”12 the United States Department
of Labor (DOL) promulgated a new regulation interpreting who
is a “fiduciary” of an employee benefit plan under ERISA.13 “A
fiduciary is an agent who is required to treat his principal with
utmost loyalty and care . . . , as if the principal were himself.”14
When an adviser is considered a fiduciary, he must abide by the
“[p]rudent man standard of care,” meaning he must provide
advice to plan participants and beneficiaries solely in their best
interest, without taking into consideration the adviser’s own
financial gains.15 The new rule “treat[s] persons who provide
investment advice or recommendations to an employee benefit
plan, plan fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA
owner as fiduciaries under ERISA and the [Internal Revenue]
Code in a wider array of advice relationships than the [previous]
regulations.”16 This broadens which advisers must provide
6 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,954 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 2509–10, 2550) [hereinafter Fiduciary Definition Final Rule]; see 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-21(c) (2014); see also Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(21)(A)(ii), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)
(2012)) (supplying the language the five-part test interprets).
7 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,954.
8 Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
9 See id.
10 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 6.
11 Id. at 3.
12 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930.
13 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,946.
14 Pohl v. Nat’l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir. 1992).
15 Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
16 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,928.
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recommendations solely in their clients’ best interest. The new
rule is necessary to protect investors from receiving conflicted
advice in connection with retirement investment decisions. These
broad protections make the new rule more congruous with the
broad protections the legislature intended ERISA to afford.
Imposing a fiduciary standard on all commission-based
retirement advice and forcing advisers to act in the investors’ best
interest17 delivers the best possible protection for that uniquely
vulnerable class of retirement investors.
Part I of this note provides a background on retirement
savings products, how they are regulated, and the different
standards of care governing retirement investment advisers.
Part II explains the previous regulation defining “fiduciary”
under ERISA and explores problems with the former regulatory
scheme. Part III tracks the DOL’s attempts to solve those
problems with the 2010 proposal, the 2015 proposal, and the
final rule. Part IV contemplates the benefits of the new rule in
protecting retirement investors. The new rule imposes the best
interest standard on all providers of retirement investment
advice, protecting them from the harms of conflicted advice.
I.

WHAT IS A FIDUCIARY?

In order to understand the complex changes the
proposal will effect upon the investment industry, one must
first understand the reasons retirement investors require a
separate standard, the purposes and legal implications of
imposing a standard of care, and the various bodies of law
governing such issues. Two standards of care govern advisers to
a retirement investor: the suitability standard and the fiduciary
standard.18 The fiduciary standard provides a heightened level of
protection to investors. Retirement investors utilize various
retirement savings options, many of which are regulated by
different bodies of governing law.19 Which standard of care
governs an adviser depends on which type of retirement savings
option the investor uses. The distinction between which advisers
are and are not considered fiduciaries is important because it
governs which standard of care applies. Different standards of
care apply to a given individual and during a given transaction.

17
18
19

See Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
See infra Section I.B.
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Standards of Care Governing Retirement Investment
Advisers

Congress enacted ERISA, which has been codified in
Title 29 of the United States Code and governs employee benefit
plans,20 to “protect the interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries, the integrity of employee benefit plans, and the
security of retirement, health, and other critical benefits.”21 The
DOL manages and enforces ERISA,22 and has the authority to
interpret its provisions.23 According to the DOL, ERISA sets the
minimum requirements for the management of retirement
plans, including mandating disclosures to participants,
establishing participation and eligibility standards, providing
legal rights to participants, and “requir[ing] accountability of
plan fiduciaries.”24 These investor-protective requirements
illustrate the extent to which the legislature intended ERISA to
protect retirement investors. ERISA imposes various obligations
on individuals who manage or advise covered plan participants
to prevent advisers from taking advantage of investors. Some of
the obligations imposed on certain advisers and experts—those
considered to be “fiduciaries”—include a heightened standard of
care, which they must follow in making recommendations.25
According to ERISA,
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.26

This rule defines a plan fiduciary as a person whose activities
and authority place him in any of the categories identified in
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,932.
22 See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/majorlaws [https://perma.cc/ZYX3-FPNB].
23 See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Am. v. Hugler, No. 3:16CV-1476-M, 2017 WL 514424, at *9–15 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017).
24 See Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/retirementplans-and-erisa-consumer [https://perma.cc/8TLK-27CG].
25 See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text; see also Fiduciary Duties, 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
26 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 3(21)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)).
20

21
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Sections 3(21)(A)(i), (ii), or (iii).27 Most relevant, for purposes of
this note, is Section 3(21)(A)(ii), which classifies a person as a
plan’s fiduciary if he advises an investor “for a fee or other
compensation.”28 In 1975, the DOL promulgated a regulation
interpreting when a person is a fiduciary under Section
3(21)(A)(ii).29 The 1975 interpretation significantly narrowed who
qualifies as a Section 3(21)(A)(ii) fiduciary, by requiring that the
adviser (1) give advice (2) on a regular basis (3) under a mutual
understanding (4) that the advice is individualized and (5) will be
the primary basis for investment decisions.30 After the 1975
interpretation, determining whether an adviser constitutes a
fiduciary required some analysis into whether the advice satisfied
the five conditions.
In contrast to ERISA-regulated 401(k) plan investors,
IRA holders did not benefit from regulations as committed to
protecting investors as ERISA. Instead, IRAs were governed by
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), which creates an even
more confusing scheme to determine which plan advisers
constitute fiduciaries.31 The Code classifies an adviser as a
fiduciary based on his actions with respect to the particular plan
at hand, i.e., whether he is acting as an adviser or just a broker.32
Under that scheme, a person is a plan’s fiduciary when acting as
an adviser, but is not a fiduciary when acting as a broker.33
The distinction between who constitutes a fiduciary under
ERISA is important because benefit-plan fiduciaries have more
duties and liabilities than nonfiduciary advisers.34 A fiduciary
must abide by the “prudent man standard of care,” meaning he
must “discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”35 ERISA and
subsequent case law provide parameters defining required,
See id.
See id. § 3(21)(A)(ii).
29 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,954.
30 Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2014); Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(21)(A)(ii), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)).
31 See Stephen Saxon, DOL Fiduciary Proposal Subjects Rollover Advice to
ERISA Fiduciary Standard of Care, PRINCIPAL FIN. GRP. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://
blog.principal.com/2015/08/27/dol-fiduciary-proposal-subjects-rollover-advice-to-erisafiduciary-standard-of-care [https://perma.cc/ZQ8E-CXSP].
32 See Rick Rodgers, Fiduciary vs. Suitability Standard, RODGERS-ASSOCS. (May
7, 2015), https://rodgers-associates.com/newsletters/fiduciary-vs-suitability-standard [https://
perma.cc/932Y-37LJ].
33 See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015) (holding that ERISA
fiduciaries’ “duty of prudence involves a continuing duty to monitor investments and
remove imprudent ones”).
35 Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
27

28
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permitted, and prohibited fiduciary actions. The prudent man
standard, as defined in ERISA § 404(a)(1) and U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1),
requires that fiduciaries act:
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants
and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; (C)
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so; and (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan.36

Under the prudent man standard of care, if a fiduciary has a
conflict of interest, she must disclose such conflict to the
investor. The standard also requires an adviser to perform
adequate research prior to advising a client and to provide
advice in the client’s best interest.37
In contrast, nonfiduciary advisers are governed by the
“suitability standard” of care, which requires only that advisers
“reasonably believe that any recommendations made to clients
are suitable in terms of the client’s financial needs, objectives,
and unique circumstances.”38 Requiring advisers to provide
suitable recommendations is less protective to investors than the
prudent man standard’s requirement that fiduciaries provide
recommendations in the investor’s best interest. A broker
violates the suitability standard if he imposes excessive
transaction costs upon an investor, such as through “excessive
trading or churning the account simply to generate more
commissions.”39 However, in various situations, a broker could
fail to disclose potential conflicts of interest without violating
the suitability standard.40
Additionally, fiduciaries under ERISA are not allowed
to receive commission-based compensation in exchange for
providing advice to a client. Investment advisers provide advice
for compensation, which is calculated using two major payment
calculation methods: a transaction-based model and a fee-based
model.41 In a transaction-based model,42 the investor pays a
Id.
See Rodgers, supra note 32.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Fiduciary, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fiduciary.asp
[https://perma.cc/WPR4-PF6G].
41 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, No. 3:16-cv-1476-M, 2017 WL
514424, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2017); David Kaufman, The Trouble with Investing
36
37
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one-time commission43 on each transaction the adviser performs
for that investment plan.44 In a fee-based model,45 the investor
pays the adviser an hourly or annual fee, or a portion of his assets
(typically 1%–1.5%) that are under the management of the
adviser per year, in exchange for the adviser’s maintenance
services.46 The different compensation structures for advisers who
all provide retirement advice serve only to confuse (and often
exploit) retirement savers.
It is important for fiduciaries to be aware of all of their
duties under the law due to the heightened liability standards
that apply. If fiduciaries violate their duties (by failing to abide
by the prudent man standard of care), they “may be personally
liable to restore any losses to the plan, or to restore any profits
made through improper use of the plan’s assets resulting from
their actions.”47 This means that if a benefits-plan holder
experiences a loss, the fiduciary could face legal ramifications
implicating his personal assets rather than solely those of his
employer. Because of the important implications of being
classified as a fiduciary under the law, it is vital that advisers
know exactly when they constitute plan fiduciaries. Moreover, it is
important for retirement savers to know exactly which standard of
care governs their advisers. Nonfiduciary advisers must give
clients suitable recommendations, while fiduciary advisers must
provide recommendations in their clients’ best interest.48 Despite
the importance, keeping the standards straight is quite complex
and changes based on which retirement savings option the
investor uses.
B.

Retirement Savings Options

Adding to investors’ confusion over when their advisers
have fiduciary obligations, the distinction sometimes turns on
which retirement savings option the investor uses. Members of
Fees: Are Commission- or Fee-Based Accounts Better?, FIN. POST (Nov. 14, 2014), http://
business.financialpost.com/investing/the-trouble-with-investing-fees-are-commissionor-fee-based-accounts-better-for-investors [https://perma.cc/244E-HGL7].
42 Also referred to as a commission-based model. See Kaufman, supra note 41.
43 Also referred to as a “sales load” or “mark-up.” See Hugler, 2017 WL
514424, at *3.
44 See id.
45 Also referred to as an assets-under-management model. See Kaufman,
supra note 41.
46 See id.; Hugler, 2017 WL 514424, at *3.
47 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER AN APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING PLAN, https://www.dol.gov/
sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/faq-ATP.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HK89-VAQL].
48 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
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the working class plan for a comfortable retirement through
various employment retirement savings plans, such as “Social
Security, traditional pensions, employer-based retirement savings
plans such as 401(k)s, and Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs).”49 Social security is a federal security plan in which all
working Americans (and their employers) pay 6.2% of their
annual income as social security taxes in exchange for the
benefit of receiving social security payments upon retirement.50
Almost all current retirees—91%—report using social security
as a source of income during retirement.51 In July 2015, the
average retired worker received $1336 per month in social
security benefits.52 The government did not intend for social
security to be the sole source of retirement savings, but rather
for it to bolster other retirement plans.53 Only 10% of
preretirement, working Americans are “very confident” that the
Social Security system will pay out consistent benefits by the
time they retire, but 84% still report anticipating social security
to be a major or minor source of their retirement income.54
Older generations typically saved for retirement through
defined benefit plans, such as traditional pension plans, in
which the employer agrees to provide an employee with a
defined amount of benefits (i.e., money) for a certain period of
time in consideration of the employee’s continued employment.55
The employer is generally the plan’s sole contributor and
manager, with no maintenance required by the employee.56 This
means that defined benefit plan holders do not require
assistance from advisers because their employers manage and
control the account funds for them. The plan is a defined benefit
plan because the value to the employee upon retirement is preestablished by the employer and not contingent upon asset
EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 2.
What Is Social Security?, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., https://www.nasi.org/
learn/socialsecurity/overview [https://perma.cc/X8Z5-QQLU].
51 RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE 2016 RETIREMENT
CONFIDENCE SURVEY: WORKER CONFIDENCE STABLE, RETIREE CONFIDENCE CONTINUES
TO INCREASE 30 (2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_422.mar16.rcs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YP85-7WHV].
52 What Is Social Security?, supra note 50.
53 Amelia Josephson, Average Retirement Savings: Are You Normal?, SMART
ASSET (Mar. 29, 2017), https://smartasset.com/retirement/average-retirement-savingsare-you-normal [https://perma.cc/S54Y-KTKJ].
54 HELMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 30–31.
55 See 4 Types of Retirement Plans and Employer-Sponsored Plans, INVESTOR
GUIDE,
http://www.investorguide.com/article/11703/4-types-of-retirement-plans-andemployer-sponsored-plans-igu [https://perma.cc/2CXA-FCYK].
56 See Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/choosing-a-retirement-plan-defined-benefitplan [https://perma.cc/P6B5-2YGV] (last updated Sept. 21, 2016).
49

50
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returns.57 While defined benefit plans still exist, they are much
less prevalent than other retirement plans.58
Today, the most common retirement plan for employed
individuals is a defined contribution plan, under which the
amount of retirement income available for an investor depends
on how much money he originally invested and how much
money his investment returned.59 This type of plan, which
requires workers to invest their own savings, starkly contrasts
the defined benefit plans of the past. Older generations using
defined benefit plans receive a defined, and therefore certain,
amount of money postretirement, while workers using defined
contribution plans make defined contributions to a plan that
will later yield an undefined, and therefore uncertain, amount
of money postretirement. The amount these contribution plans
yield depends on a variety of factors, including the value of
both the employer’s and the employee’s contributions, the
performance of the account’s investments, and the length of
time the funds remain invested.60
One example of a defined contribution plan is a 401(k)
plan, named for Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code.61 A
401(k) is a retirement plan “under which a covered employee
may elect to have the employer make payments as contributions
to a trust under the plan on behalf of the employee, or to the
employee directly in cash.”62 The trust is “nonforfeitable,”63 and
employees and other beneficiaries receive 401(k) funds when they
end the employment, reach age 59½, die, or become disabled, but
not “merely by reason of the completion of a stated period of
participation or the lapse of a fixed number of years.”64 In other
words, under no circumstances would an employee forfeit all the
money he invested in a 401(k); however, should he withdraw
funds from a 401(k) prior to reaching age 59½, he would face a

See id.
See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,954.
59 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 2.
60 See Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/
retirement/typesofplans [https://perma.cc/FG5Z-7VAW]; Defined Benefit Plans Versus Defined
Contribution Plans, MY RETIREMENT PAYCHECK, http://www.myretirementpaycheck.org/
retirement-plans/defined-benefit-plans.aspx [https://perma.cc/8G35-SMW5].
61 See EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 2; see
also 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).
62 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2)(A).
63 Id. § 401(k)(2)(C) (“[A]n employee’s right to his accrued benefit derived from
employer contributions made to the trust pursuant to his election is nonforfeitable.”).
Nonforfeitable benefits are “[b]enefits that are vested, meaning that they belong fully to the
employee and may not be rescinded.” Nonforfeitable Benefits, INVESTOR WORDS, http://
www.investorwords.com/5682/nonforfeitable_benefit.html [https://perma.cc/MJ6N-HN5T].
64 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2)(B).
57
58

1792

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

penalty of 10% of the amount withdrawn.65 401(k) plans are
established and controlled by the employer. ERISA governs the
standard of care required of investment advisers to 401(k) plans
and generally classifies them as fiduciaries.
Another example of a defined contribution plan is an
IRA. Unlike 401(k) plans, individuals, rather than employers,
establish and control IRAs.66 The Code regulates who may
contribute to IRAs, how much money they may contribute, and
when account holders may and must withdraw funds.67
Individuals may not hold IRA funds indefinitely and must
begin taking “required minimum distributions” after reaching
the age of 70½.68 Individuals can withdraw funds from their
IRAs at any time but may face penalties for withdrawing funds
prior to attaining age 59½.69 The Code also governs the standard
of care required of advisers to IRA investors. Unlike investment
advisers to 401(k)s, advisers to IRAs are not always considered
fiduciaries of the investor. Advisers are not fiduciaries when
they are simply “charging a commission on a transaction separate
from providing advice.”70 This is problematic because when an
investor regularly receives advice from an adviser, the investor
may believe that the adviser is always a fiduciary. In reality,
however, the adviser is only legally obligated to act in the
investor’s best interest when providing advice directly related to a
transaction for which the adviser will receive a commission.
Employers create and control 401(k) plans, but upon
employment termination, the employee may need to cash out
the funds in his 401(k) account or transfer them to another
account.71 If the former employee has not yet reached the age of
65 Beware of Cashing Out Your 401(k), FIDELITY (May 31, 2016), https://
www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/cashing-out [https://perma.cc/3EDV-WHXU].
66 See Stephanie Powers, 11 Things You May Not Know About Your IRA,
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/08/11things-to-know-iras.asp [https://perma.cc/4B8A-5C5G].
67 See Traditional and Roth IRAs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://
www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/traditional-and-roth-iras
[https://perma.cc/5B3E-76WB]
(last updated Jan. 30, 2017).
68 Id.;
Retirement Topics—Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participantemployee/retirement-topics-required-minimum-distributions-rmds [https://perma.cc/
F3DB-7CC7] (last updated Feb. 15, 2017).
69 Traditional and Roth IRAs, supra note 67.
70 Tobie Stanger, Look for an Adviser with Fiduciary Duty to Save Money on
Your IRA, CONSUMER REP. (July 7, 2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/
07/look-for-an-adviser-with-fiduciary-duty-to-save-money-on-your-ira/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/8TMT-QCBV].
71 See Deciding What to Do with Your 401(k) Plan When You Change Jobs,
AMERIPRISE
FIN.,
https://www.ameriprise.com/research-market-insights/financialarticles/retirement/what-to-do-with-your-401k-plan-when-you-change-jobs
[https://
perma.cc/TLT7-CTLF].
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59½, the age at which an investor may cash out his 401(k)
without penalty, he must transfer his 401(k) plan into an IRA
or into a 401(k) with another company.72 In fact, “the
overwhelming majority of money flowing into IRAs comes from
rollovers from an employer-based retirement plan [like 401(k)],
not direct IRA contributions.”73 According to the DOL, “[a]s
baby boomers retire, they are increasingly moving money from
ERISA-covered plans [like 401(k)s], where their employer has
both the incentive and the fiduciary duty to facilitate sound
investment choices, to IRAs where both good and bad
investment choices are myriad and advice that is conflicted is
commonplace.”74 This means that when an employee reaches a
point where he must decide what to do with his 401(k), it is
imperative that he receives trustworthy—and not conflicted—
advice from a professional. It is at that stage where the ERISAprotected 401(k) plan participant, whose advisers always had
fiduciary obligations, must now seek advice from a new adviser,
unrelated to his previous employment, whose fiduciary status is
unknown or ambiguous.75 Unversed in these complex investment
regulations, the investor is often unaware that his new adviser
does not have the same obligations, leaving him vulnerable to
making important decisions based on conflicted advice.
Another retirement investment option to help investors
achieve lifetime income is an annuity contract, which guarantees
a client’s return investment.76 Under an annuity contract, the
beneficiary gives the insurance company a set amount or a
series of payments in exchange for the insurer’s promise to
72 See id.; 401(k) vs. IRA, DIFFEN, http://www.diffen.com/difference/401(k)_vs_
IRA [https://perma.cc/BHQ8-VT5J].
73 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 2.
74 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,932.
75 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 8 (“At the
point of rollover, savers are making decisions about large quantities of money relative
to the sums involved in other more common financial decisions. Many savers may not
have full knowledge about their options or a complete understanding of the detailed
regulatory differences between their employer plan and an IRA—most notably that
advice to roll money out of the plan into an IRA is generally subject to much lower
standards of care than advice received in the plan.”).
76 See The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, Comment Letter
on Proposed Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice Under 29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509–10, at 6–7 (July 21, 2015), https://
www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/publiccomments/1210-AB32-2/00767.pdf [https://perma.cc/37NH-NSEB] [hereinafter Guardian
Life Insurance, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal]; see also Annuities: What Is an
Annuity?, ST. FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO., https://www.statefarm.com/finances/annuities/
what-is-an-annuity [https://perma.cc/9RAC-R359] (“With a Fixed Annuity, money is
placed in fixed-rate investments such as bonds, where it will earn a fixed interest rate for
a certain period of time. For most fixed annuities, a minimum interest rate is guaranteed.
With a Fixed Annuity, the insurance company is taking the investment risk.”).

1794

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

provide the beneficiary with a series of periodic payments
beginning immediately or in the future.77 Unlike employee
benefit plans, annuities are unrelated to a person’s employment.
There are three categories of annuities: fixed annuities, indexed
annuities, and variable annuities.78 In a fixed annuity, the
beneficiary contracts to receive a specified amount of money for
a specified period of time.79 Because the benefits are stated and
therefore not reliant on other factors, the beneficiary is
guaranteed to receive the funds for the specified period. The
amount a beneficiary pays to an annuity is typically taxdeferred, meaning the beneficiary is not taxed on the income
until it is removed from the annuity (i.e., paid out).80 According
to State Farm, “[d]eferred annuities can also be a good way to
help increase your retirement savings [because t]he taxdeferral and compounding of interest provided by an annuity
can help it to grow larger than an equal investment in a
taxable account.”81 Annuities also help investors “protect
against the risk of outliving their incomes.”82
Investors saving for retirement have many investment
options from which to choose. Furthermore, investors often
need to utilize more than one option over the course of their
investing.83 Retirement investors’ vulnerability in weighing
their options and making decisions demonstrates the need for
trustworthy advisers. Consequently, advisers should operate
under a uniform standard of care when recommending
retirement saving options. An adviser with fiduciary
obligations must provide recommendations in the client’s best
interest, without taking into consideration the adviser’s own
financial gains.84 Despite investors’ vulnerability in managing
retirement investments, the previous definition of fiduciary
under ERISA did not provide sufficient protections.

77 Fast Answers: Annuities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/annuity.htm [https://perma.cc/M8F8-KGMM] (last updated Apr. 6, 2011).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Annuities: What Is an Annuity?, supra note 76.
81 Id.
82 Ed Perlmutter, House of Reps, Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of the
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice Under 29
C.F.R. Pts. 2509–10 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/lawsand-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2/02751.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GR8-U7GY] [hereinafter Ed Perlmutter, Comment Letter on 2015
Proposal].
83 For example, when an investor must decide what to do with a 401(k) plan
upon employment termination prior to retirement.
84 See Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
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PROBLEMS WITH THE FORMER DEFINITION OF
“FIDUCIARY”

As originally enacted, ERISA afforded broad protections
to retirement investors. It broadly imposed fiduciary obligations
on many categories of advisers. Subsequent interpretation,
however, significantly decreased this protection. The later
addition of a five-part test to determine when an adviser is a
fiduciary narrowed which advisers must abide by the best
interest standard of care. Under this test, investment advice
must satisfy five conditions to impose fiduciary obligations on
the adviser. This rigorous test allows many advisers, whose
clients think they are fiduciaries and who should be considered
their fiduciaries, to avoid legal fiduciary obligations.
Problematically, this left retirement investors vulnerable to
manipulation and exploitation by their advisers. The
incoherence among advisers to IRAs, which are regulated by
the Code, and 401(k)s, which are regulated by ERISA, further
confused investors. To combat this confusion, the DOL
promulgated a new regulation to broaden which advisers
constitute fiduciaries, making it more congruous with the
broad protections the legislature intended ERISA to afford.85
A.

Broad Protections of ERISA as Originally Enacted

As originally enacted, ERISA broadly classified most
advisers as plan fiduciaries. Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA lays out
two general categories of individuals who are considered
“fiduciaries” of an employee benefits plan.86 A person is a
fiduciary of an ERISA-covered plan to the extent she exercises
discretionary authority or control over the plan’s management or
administration.87 This category covers the team that the
employer, as 401(k) plan sponsor, selects to administer and
manage the plan.88 The employer’s administrative team
includes service providers, plan trustees, and anyone who
exercises discretion over the management of the plan (i.e.,
directors or human resources members).89 The first category
makes clear that anyone who exercises control or discretion
See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,928.
See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, § 3(21)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)).
87 Id.
88 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 1
(2012), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
publications/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P66-52Y7].
89 See id. at 1–2.
85

86

1796

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:4

over a plan is the plan’s fiduciary.90 ERISA defines the second
category—the plan’s advisers—much more vaguely.
Section 3(21)(A)(ii) provides that a person is a fiduciary
to the extent that “he renders investment advice for a fee or
other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so.”91 The investment advice rule attaches a
fiduciary duty to investment advisers who may not exercise
authority or control over the plan.92 This is important because
plan sponsors and beneficiaries typically lack the investment
expertise necessary to make investment decisions without
receiving advice from outside experts. Because recipients rely
so heavily on outside advisers, and place a heightened level of
trust in them due to the nature of retirement planning, certain
investment advisers must be considered plan fiduciaries—and
provide advice solely in the investor’s best interest—in order to
protect the investor. According to the DOL, the ERISA
definition “reflect[s] Congress’ recognition in 1974 of the
fundamental importance of such advice to protect savers’
retirement nest eggs.”93 The goal of protecting investors’
retirement savings has not changed; however, the law itself has
undergone changes that undercut the realization of that goal.94
B.

Five-Part Test Excludes Crucial Advisers from Fiduciary
Obligations

In 1975, the DOL significantly narrowed ERISA’s
investment advice rule by enacting 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-21(c), which
provides certain instances where a person “renders investment
advice” under ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii).95 The 1975 interpretation
provides a five-part test for determining whether an adviser is
a fiduciary:
for advice to constitute “investment advice,” an adviser who is not a
fiduciary under another provision of the statute must—(1) render
advice as to the value of securities or other property, or make
recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or
selling securities or other property (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant
to a mutual agreement, arrangement or understanding, with the plan
or a plan fiduciary that (4) the advice will serve as a primary basis for
See id.; Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A).
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A)(ii) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii)).
92 See id.
93 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,933.
94 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2014).
95 Id.
90

91
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investment decisions with respect to plan assets, and that (5) the
advice will be individualized based on the particular needs of the plan
or IRA.96

A person is only considered a “fiduciary” for rendering
investment advice under ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii) if she meets
those five requirements.97 This test significantly narrowed the
class of advisers who constitute an investor’s fiduciary.98
The language of ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii) itself, as originally
enacted, was very broad, and included any adviser who falls
within its ambit, regardless of the nature of the adviser’s
relationship with the particular investor.99 The wording of the
statute does not contemplate the elements of the 1975
interpretation’s five-part test. The language does not mention the
frequency with which the adviser renders advice to the particular
investor, the agreement between the adviser and the investor, or
the importance of the advice to investment decisions.100 Thus, the
five-part test limits which advisers constitute fiduciaries by
providing three additional conditions not present in the rule
itself.101 The DOL expressed concerns “that the specific elements
of the five-part test—which are not found in the text of the Act
or the Code—now work to frustrate statutory goals and defeat
advice recipients’ legitimate expectations.”102 Investors expect
their advisers to act in their best interest. The five-part test
frees some advisers from fiduciary obligations, minimizing the
broad protections investors once enjoyed under ERISA.
C.

Conflicts of Interest Undercut the “Fiduciary” Definition

The former fiduciary definition excluded some advisers
who should fall under that classification for rendering the type
of advice ERISA intended to protect. This left the public
vulnerable to advisers with conflicting interests who do not have
the heightened duties and liabilities of fiduciary advisers.103 One
96 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,933; see 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-21(c); see also Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
§ 3(21)(A)(ii) (supplying the language of the investment advice rule).
97 See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c).
98 Compare Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A),
with 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c).
99 See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A).
100 See id.
101 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,933; 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-21(c); see also Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
§ 3(21)(A)(ii) (supplying the language of the investment advice rule interpreted by 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)).
102 Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,933.
103 See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A);
Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930.
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main cause of this problem is the five-part test’s narrow
interpretation of the investment advice rule. Because the
statutory language has been interpreted so narrowly, the
practical effect of the five-part test is that it is easy to get out of
fiduciary duties simply by proving that one element is missing.104
Without that fiduciary protection in place, retirement savers are
vulnerable to receiving guidance from advisers whose interests
are related to the suggested investment. The DOL is particularly
concerned that nonfiduciary advisers will “give imprudent and
disloyal advice; steer plans and IRA owners to investments
based on their own, rather than their customers’ financial
interests; and act on conflicts of interest in ways that would be
prohibited if the same persons were fiduciaries.”105 Nonfiduciary
advisers have limited liability for their clients’ losses, so there is
less to deter them from providing self-interested advice.106
Further, nonfiduciary advisers need not disclose some
conflicts of interest, leaving investors vulnerable to conflicts
they did not know existed.107 “[D]irect and substantial conflicts
of interest” exist between plan beneficiaries and nonfiduciary
advisers when advisers receive compensation for promoting
certain investments.108 Problematically, this incentivizes advisers
to recommend investments that generate the most revenue to the
advisers, even if those investments will generate lower returns for
the investors.109 “Conflicted payments are payments to the
adviser that depend on the actions taken by the advisee,” while
nonconflicted payments include “an hourly rate, a percentage of
assets, or other similar fees that do not directly depend on the
investment decisions made by the client.”110 The United States
Council of Economic Advisers, in its report, The Effects of
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings, found
that retirement “[s]avers receiving conflicted advice earn
returns roughly 1 percentage point lower each year,” meaning
“conflicted advice reduces what would be a 6 percent return to
a 5 percent return.”111 The Council also found that, “[a] retiree
who receives conflicted advice when rolling over a 401(k)
balance to an IRA at retirement will lose an estimated 12
percent of the value of his or her savings if drawn down over 30
years,” meaning “his or her savings would run out more than 5
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c).
See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,946.
See id.
See id.
See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930.
Id.
EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. at 2.
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years earlier.”112 It is often imperative for investors to
transition from ERISA-protected 401(k) plans to other
retirement savings options that may not oblige advisers to adhere
to the fiduciary standard of care.113 Moreover, at this stage, many
future retirees are inexperienced investors. In its report, the
Council further pointed out that “for many Americans making
decisions about their IRA investments will be one of the only
times they must confront the full set of investment products
available in the marketplace and as such will be one of the most
complicated savings decisions they will face in their lifetime.”114
The statement was based on the Survey of Consumer Finances,
which found that while about half of Americans saved for
retirement through employee benefits plans and IRAs, outside of
those plans, “only 14 percent held individual stocks, only 8
percent held mutual funds or other pooled investment funds, and
even fewer held CDs, individual bonds, or other managed
assets.”115 Obtaining trustworthy professional advice is important
because investors are typically inexperienced with the multitude
of options available. The effects of conflicts of interest, in
conjunction with the necessity for investors to utilize multiple
retirement savings options and their vulnerability at that stage,
evidence the dire need for new regulation to protect the savings of
retirement investors.
D.

Inconsistencies Between Advisers to IRAs and 401(k)s
Exacerbates Confusion

The former regulatory scheme makes it difficult for
investors to know when their advisers are fiduciaries, and thus
not vulnerable to conflicts of interest. The Code regulates IRAs
while ERISA regulates 401(k) plans. This creates confusion for
investors, especially those transferring funds from a 401(k)
plan into an IRA.116 While all fiduciaries are held to the same,
prudent man standard of care,117 who classifies as a fiduciary
varies between IRAs and 401(k) plans. ERISA imposes fiduciary
obligations on advisers who provide recommendations to 401(k)
investors for a fee.118 The Code, however, classifies an adviser as
a fiduciary based on his actions with respect to the particular
Id. at 3.
See supra Section I.B.
114 EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 8.
115 Id. at 8 n.6.
116 See supra Section I.A.
117 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
118 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 3(21)(A)(ii), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (2012)).
112
113
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IRA at hand, i.e., whether he is acting as an adviser or just a
broker.119 A person is an investor’s fiduciary when acting as an
adviser, but is not a fiduciary when acting as a broker.120 An
investment adviser is:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or writings,
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as
part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports
concerning securities.121

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) holds
brokers to the less-protective suitability standard.122 A broker is
“any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others.”123 Some individuals are
authorized as investment advisers and as brokers; which
standards govern their behavior depends on its nature, whether
they are acting as an adviser or a broker.124 When an adviser
provides any advice unrelated to the value of securities or
whether an investor should invest, purchase, or sell, that
adviser is considered a broker and not an investment adviser.125
This can easily confuse an investor if he meets with his adviser
as a fiduciary on one occasion, and then the next time he meets
with his adviser, unbeknownst to the client, the adviser is not
providing advice sufficiently connected to the transaction to be
considered his fiduciary.126 For example, consider a retirement
investor who meets with an adviser to address his retirement
needs. He pays the adviser a fee of a percentage of the funds he
wishes to invest and requests advice pertaining to which
retirement savings options would be most beneficial. The
investor ends up investing in Investment X. Throughout this
transaction, the adviser is the investor’s fiduciary. Now
See Rodgers, supra note 32.
See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
121 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 202(a)(11), 54 Stat.
847, 848 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012)).
122 Rodgers, supra note 32.
123 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
124 See Sean Ross, Career Advice: Stockbroker vs. Financial Adviser, INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/professionals/092915/career-advicestockbroker-vs-financial-advisor.asp [https://perma.cc/9NQY-RDB4]; see generally Ethan S.
Braid, Is My Financial Advisor a Fiduciary or a Stockbroker?, HIGH PASS ASSET MGMT.
(Mar. 2013), http://www.highpassasset.com/blog/58-is-my-financial-advisor-a-fiduciary-or-astockbroker.html [https://perma.cc/SJZ4-F3CW] (comparing the nature and obligations of
advisers and brokers).
125 See § 202(a)(11), 54 Stat. 847, 848 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11)).
126 See, e.g., Braid, supra note 124.
119

120
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imagine that our investor, a few weeks later, calls the adviser
and requests she move his funds from Investment X to
Investment Y. While Investment Y is a suitable investment for
our investor, the move is not in his best interest. The adviser
knows this, but also knows that Investment Y pays a high
commission, so she simply transfers the funds. The investor
loses money. During the second transaction, the adviser was
acting only as a broker and thus was not governed by the
fiduciary standard—despite the fact that the same adviser had
been the investor’s fiduciary just weeks earlier.
The former regulatory scheme was riddled with problems.
The five-part test excludes many surprising advisers from
fiduciary obligations. Furthermore, many investors receive
guidance from advisers who may receive financial compensation
for recommending certain investments. Finally, different rules
govern advisers to investors holding IRAs and those holding
401(k) plans. This makes it nearly impossible for retirement
investors to keep track of which standard of care governs their
investment advisers.
III.

THE NEW FIDUCIARY RULE

To combat the problems with the former fiduciary rule,
the DOL has been working since 2010 to amend the
definition.127 The DOL proposed a new regulation in 2010 (the
2010 proposal) in an attempt to remove the five-part test and
broaden the definition of fiduciary.128 The 2010 proposal was met
with widespread criticism and was ultimately withdrawn.129 The
DOL proposed a new regulation in 2015 (the 2015 proposal) to
accomplish the same purpose as the 2010 proposal.130 The DOL
considered the notes and comments submitted for the 2015
proposal, and amended it to promulgate the final fiduciary rule
(the final rule).131 The final rule provides a more inclusive
regulation for determining which advisers and types of advice
require heightened duties of care. The new rule protects
retirement investors from the harmful effects of receiving
conflicted advice. Additionally, it applies ERISA’s fiduciary
standard uniformly to all advisers who provide retirement
127 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263
(proposed Oct. 22, 2010, withdrawn Apr. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Fiduciary Definition
2010 Proposal].
128 See id. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii)(B) (2014), with Fiduciary
Definition 2010 Proposal, supra note 127, at 65,263.
129 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,928.
130 See id.
131 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,946–47.
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investment advice. This removes investors’ confusion over when
their advisers owe them fiduciary obligations. The final rule is
more congruous with investors’ expectations and the broad
protections the legislature intended ERISA to afford.
A.

The 2015 Proposal

The 2015 proposal attempted to broaden the definition
of investment advice that imposes fiduciary obligations on
advisers.132 Specifically, it provides that advisers render
investment advice sufficient to classify them as fiduciaries by
providing investment recommendations and either (1)
“acknowledging the fiduciary nature of the advice” or (2)
providing the recommendation under a mutual understanding
that the advice is individualized to that particular client.133 This
would subject many advisers to fiduciary obligations they did not
have prior to the 2015 proposal. The proposal’s definition has two
parts: one which defines the types of investment advice that
would trigger fiduciary status and another defining certain
actions the adviser must take to be considered a fiduciary.134
Starting with the first part, the four categories of advice
that will rend an adviser a plan fiduciary are:
(i) A recommendation as to the advisability of acquiring, holding,
disposing or exchanging securities or other property, including a
recommendation to take a distribution of benefits or a recommendation
as to the investment of securities or other property to be rolled over or
otherwise distributed from the plan or IRA;
(ii) A recommendation as to the management of securities or other
property, including recommendations as to the management of
securities or other property to be rolled over or otherwise distributed
from the plan or IRA;
(iii) An appraisal, fairness opinion, or similar statement whether
verbal or written concerning the value of securities or other property
if provided in connection with a specific transaction or transactions
involving the acquisition, disposition, or exchange, of such securities
or other property by the plan or IRA;
(iv) A recommendation of a person who is also going to receive a fee or
other compensation for providing any of the types of advice described
in paragraphs (i) through (iii) . . . .135

132
133
134
135

Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,936.
Id. at 21,929.
See id. at 21,956–57.
Id.
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According to the definition, rendering advice outside of those
four categories does not trigger fiduciary status.136 In that
manner, the DOL transcended from precluding specific advisers
and brokers from receiving commission-based compensation, to
precluding specific types of advice. This shift of focus from a
person to a category of advice represents the DOL’s belief that it
is the type of advice being given that should trigger the
heightened level of care, rather than the relationship
established between the particular investor and adviser at a
particular moment with regard to a particular transaction.
The second part of the definition lays out certain actions
the adviser must take in order to become a fiduciary.137 Three
different actions trigger fiduciary status.138 An adviser
constitutes a fiduciary when providing one of the preceding four
categories of advice if she also provides the advice in exchange
for compensation and either (1) acknowledges that the advice
she is providing typically accompanies a fiduciary status, or (2)
provides the advice under a mutual understanding with the
investor that the advice is individualized to that particular
investor.139 This test to determine whether an adviser has
fiduciary obligations is much broader than the five-part test.
This new definition essentially turns the five-part test—
which only designates as fiduciaries advisers who (1) render
advice (2) regularly (3) pursuant to an understanding with a plan
fiduciary that (4) decisions will be made primarily on the advice
(5) that is individualized to the particular plan140—into a two-part
test requiring only the first and last factors. Removing three
conditions from the fiduciary definition undoubtedly renders
the definition more likely to apply in a greater number of
situations. This was the exact intention of the DOL: to apply
fiduciary status in more situations, especially those involving
retirement investors, so as to better protect the American
public.141 Under the new proposal, an adviser could be considered
a fiduciary where he previously would not, (1) despite having
provided advice on a strictly one-time basis (no “regular basis”
requirement), (2) if the advice is specific or individualized but
not provided to serve as a “primary basis” for decisions (no
“primary basis” requirement), and (3) even if the adviser and
See id.
See id.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 21,929.
140 See id. at 21,933; 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2014); see also Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(21)(A)(ii), 88 Stat. 829,
836 (2012) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2012)).
141 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,928.
136
137
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investor are not operating under a mutual agreement that the
advice will serve as a primary basis for making investment
decisions (no “mutual” requirement).142 Though the 2015
proposal would impose fiduciary obligations on many more
advisers than the five-part test, the proposal also provides for
situations where advisers who would be classified as fiduciaries
are able get out of those fiduciary obligations as long as certain
protections are in place. One example is the education carve-out,
which exempts from fiduciary obligations certain categories of
investment education materials.143 Another example is the BIC
exemption, which allows advisers to receive commissions for
certain investments, despite their status as fiduciaries, as long
as they satisfy various conditional protective measures.144
1. Education Carve-Out
To soften the blow to advisers, the 2015 proposal defines
various carve-outs and exemptions to the proposed fiduciary
definition.145 The practical application of these carve-outs is
that they remove the fiduciary classification of a party who
would otherwise be classified as a fiduciary under the two-part
test.146 The carve-outs, in general terms, cover (1) certain
counterparty or seller’s transactions, (2) employees providing
advice in exchange for nothing more than their typical
employment salary, (3) certain platform providers, (4) nonindividualized selection and monitoring assistance, (5) certain
financial reports and valuations, and (6) various categories of
investment education materials.147 If an adviser’s actions meet
the conditions of one of the carve-outs, he will not be considered
a fiduciary under ERISA or the Code despite meeting the
conditions of the proposed fiduciary definition.148
The education carve-out specifically excludes from the
fiduciary definition six categories of investment education
information and materials as long as they “do not include
(standing alone or in combination with other materials)
recommendations with respect to specific investment products or
specific plan or IRA alternatives, or recommendations on
142 See id. at 21,933; 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c); see also Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(21)(A)(ii).
143 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,941–51.
144 See Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,960,
21,984 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
145 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,941–51.
146 See id. at 21,941.
147 See id. at 21,941–45.
148 See id. at 21,941.
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investment, management, or value of a particular security or
securities, or other property.”149 But, it excludes from the carveout (or in other words, imposes fiduciary liability upon)
information describing the terms or operation of an employee
benefits plan or IRA, information or materials explaining
retirement income needs, and historical return information.150
Also excluded from the carve-out are asset allocation models
that “include or identify any specific investment product or
specific alternative available under the plan or IRA.”151 Thus, it
excludes things like specific product information, even if it is not
individualized to a plan or IRA.152
2. Best Interest Contract (BIC) Exemption
In addition to the carve-outs, which remove fiduciary
classification to advisers in certain situations, the proposal
included exemptions to the fiduciary definition.153 The exemptions
trigger a less rigorous form of fiduciary classification, one that
allows the adviser to receive commission-based compensation
provided that the adviser adheres to various safety measures.154
One such exemption is the Best Interest Contract exemption,
which
permits Advisers, Financial Institutions, and their Affiliates and
Related Entities to receive compensation for services provided in
connection with a purchase, sale or holding of an Asset by a Plan,
participant or beneficiary account, or IRA, as a result of the
Adviser’s and Financial Institution’s advice to any of the following
‘‘Retirement Investors:’’
(1) A participant or beneficiary of a Plan subject to Title I of ERISA
with authority to direct the investment of assets in his or her Plan
account or to take a distribution;
(2) The beneficial owner of an IRA acting on behalf of the IRA; or
(3) A plan sponsor as described in ERISA section 3(16)(B) (or any
employee, officer or director thereof) of a non-participant-directed Plan
subject to Title I of ERISA with fewer than 100 participants, to the
extent it acts as a fiduciary who has authority to make investment
decisions for the Plan.155

See id. at 21,958.
See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 21,941–51.
154 See id.
155 Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,960, 21,984
(proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
149
150
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Under the 2015 proposal, advisers under the BIC exemption
would not be held to the normal fiduciary standards as outlined
in ERISA § 404(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). The normal
fiduciary standard prohibits the exchange of advice on a
commission-based model.156 Instead, advisers under the BIC
exemption would be required to “contractually acknowledge
fiduciary status, commit to adhere to basic standards of
impartial conduct, warrant that they have adopted policies and
procedures reasonably designed to mitigate any harmful impact
of conflicts of interest, and disclose basic information on their
conflicts of interest and on the cost of their advice.”157 In
addition, they must avoid misleading the investor and
providing advice and recommendations outside of the investor’s
best interest.158 The BIC exemption dictates that if an adviser
enacts the stated protective measures, and provides advice that is
in the investor’s best interest, the adviser can receive commissionbased compensation.159 Advisers are only permitted, however, to
receive reasonable amounts of commission-based compensation.160
While the proposal imposes fiduciary obligations on
many more advisers than former regulation imposed, advisers
can also retain their commission-based compensation models by
agreeing to act in their clients’ best interest.161 This compromise
reduces the burden on advisers participating in the BIC
exemption while increasing the protection afforded to retirement
investors. The 2015 proposal, however, went too far in its
protections. Under its rules, individualized education materials
would not trigger fiduciary status when they only provide
objective factual information. This would reduce the
educational materials available for investors. The final rule
provides a better compromise of increasing protection while
maintaining investors’ access to educational materials.
B.

The Final Rule

The final fiduciary rule broadly preserves the structure
and substance of the 2015 proposal, mostly clarifying focal
provisions that many commenters opposed or misunderstood.162
According to the DOL, the final rule more closely conforms to
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

See id.; Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1) (2012); see supra Section I.A.
Proposed Best Interest Contract Exemption, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,961.
See id.
See id. at 21,941–51.
See id. at 21,961.
See id.
See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,960–61.
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ERISA’s “broad scope” of protections.163 Under the final rule, an
adviser provides “investment advice” sufficient to render him a
fiduciary if he provides one of two categories of investment
recommendations to a retirement investor in exchange for
compensation.164 The first ERISA category of investment
recommendations, Section 3(21)(a)(1)(i), covers recommendations
pertaining to the advisability of holding assets in a plan or
IRA.165 The second category, Section 3(21)(a)(1)(ii), covers
recommendations pertaining to the management, and transfer of
assets held in a plan or IRA.166
“Under the final rule, whether a ‘recommendation’ has
occurred is a threshold issue and the initial step in determining
whether investment advice has occurred.”167 One main departure
from the 2015 proposal is the final rule’s focus on a
recommendation as the focal point of the analysis.168 A
recommendation is “a communication that, based on its content,
context, and presentation, would reasonably be viewed as a
suggestion that the advice recipient engage in or refrain from
taking a particular course of action.”169 This definition highlights
the DOL’s goal of preventing advisers from subtly influencing
investors not to make decisions in their best interest. For
example, the rule advises that an adviser makes a
recommendation by “[p]roviding a selective list of securities to
a particular advice recipient as appropriate for that investor,”
even if the adviser does not specifically point out any securities
on the list.170 Moreover, various actions that would not
individually constitute recommendations may constitute a
recommendation when considered together.171 The DOL advises
that “the more individually tailored the communication is to a
specific advice recipient or recipients about, for example, a
security, investment property, or investment strategy, the more
likely the communication will be viewed as a recommendation.”172
The inquiry into whether an adviser made a recommendation is
an objective, rather than subjective, inquiry.173 To make the

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 20,946; see supra Section II.A.
See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,960–61.
Id. at 20,961.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,962.
Id. at 20,997–98 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(1)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,997.
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determination, the fact finder must consider all available “facts
and circumstances.”174
The final rule excludes four categories of objective
educational materials the DOL categorizes as less influential
over investors from the definition of recommendation.175 The
four categories include (1) providing platforms which allow
investors to select or monitor investment alternatives, as long as
certain conditions are met;176 (2) providing assistance with
selection and monitoring of investment alternatives;177 (3) sending
investors general communications;178 and (4) furnishing
nonparticularized investment education materials.179 Advisers
may provide any of the foregoing four categories of materials
without providing a recommendation.180 This means that advisers
may provide these educational materials without undertaking
fiduciary obligations.181 The education carve-out exempts four
categories of educational information from the definition of
recommendation: plan information, general information, asset
allocation models, and interactive investment materials. The
final rule’s exclusions provide adequate protection for
investors while maintaining their access to helpful tools and
educational materials.
The DOL’s Regulatory Impact Analysis found that
requiring advisers to disclose conflicts of interests was
ineffective, by itself, to combat conflicts and protect investors.182
This is because, as the DOL paternalistically explained, “most
investors have little understanding of their advisers’ conflicts
of interest, and little awareness of what they are paying via
indirect channels for the conflicted advice.”183 The final rule will
effectively accomplish the DOL’s goals of combating conflicts
and protecting investors by more broadly categorizing which
types of advice will create a fiduciary relationship between the
adviser and the investor.184 The DOL expects the rule to save
investors “between $33 billion and $36 billion over 10 years and
Id. at 20,962.
See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)).
176 See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)(i)).
177 See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)(ii)).
178 See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)(iii)).
179 See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)(iv)).
180 See id. at 20,998 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(b)(2)).
181 See id.
182 DEP’T OF LABOR, REGULATING ADVICE MARKETS 8 (2016) [hereinafter
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS], https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-andregulations/rules-and-regulations/completed-rulemaking/1210-AB32-2/conflict-ofinterest-ria.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YW9-2YCG].
183 Id. at 9.
184 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,950.
174
175

2017]

DEFINING “FIDUCIARY”

1809

between $66 and $76 billion over 20 years,” by eliminating the
conflicts that arise when advisers receive varying compensation
for recommending certain mutual funds.185
The final rule was published on April 8, 2016, and became
effective on June 7, 2016.186 The rule had an applicability date of
April 10, 2017, which gave affected advisers one year in which to
prepare new policies in accordance with the rule.187 Shortly after
the final rule was published, the House and Senate approved a
resolution to defeat the rule.188 Former President Barack Obama
vetoed the resolution, asserting that the final rule’s promulgation
“is critical to protecting Americans’ hard-earned savings and
preserving their retirement security.”189 Shortly after President
Donald Trump took office, he published a memorandum for the
Secretary of Labor in the Federal Register.190 He advised that
the final rule “may significantly alter the manner in which
Americans can receive financial advice, and may not be
consistent with the policies of [his] Administration.”191 The
memorandum directs the DOL to analyze whether the final
rule reduces retirement investors’ access to advice and
informative materials.192 If the DOL should find that the rule
does reduce such access, the memorandum directs the DOL to
publish a new proposal amending or rescinding the rule for
notice and comment.193 The final rule should be enacted as
written because it protects retirement investors from the dire
consequences of receiving untrustworthy advice.
IV.

HOLDING ADVISERS ACCOUNTABLE

The new fiduciary rule accomplishes two things
simultaneously: it widens the pool of advisers and types of
advice that require heightened duties of care and it lowers the
burden that such duties impose on the advisers, rendering it the
ultimate compromise. The previous regulation, with its five-part
test, has been interpreted far too narrowly to adequately protect
retirement investors. The new rule protects retirement investors
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 182, at 10.
Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,946.
187 See id.
188 See Mark Schoeff Jr., Obama Vetoes Resolution Against DOL Fiduciary Rule;
Court Sets Date for NAFA’s Lawsuit, INV. NEWS (June 8, 2016), http://www.
investmentnews.com/article/20160608/FREE/160609915/obama-vetoes-resolutionagainst-dol-fiduciary-rule-court-sets-date [https://perma.cc/LUX4-VJV2].
189 Id.
190 Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor, 82 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Feb. 3, 2017).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
185
186
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from the harmful effects of receiving conflicted advice.
Additionally, it applies ERISA’s fiduciary standard uniformly to
all advisers who provide retirement investment advice. This
removes investors’ confusion over when their investors owe them
fiduciary obligations. While critics argue that the new rule may
harm investors through higher expenses and restricted access
to advice, products, and services, the benefits of the new rule
outweigh those concerns. Furthermore, investors will not lose
access to all advice, products and services; rather, they will only
lose access to advice not in their best interest. The multitude of
retirement saving options available to investors, and the need for
investors to utilize more than one option,194 evidences the
importance of a uniform standard of care for advisers who
recommend retirement saving options. Moreover, the
vulnerability of retirement investors in weighing their options
evidences the need for their advisers to be fiduciaries who must
provide advice that is in the investors’ best interest, without
taking into consideration the adviser’s own financial gains.195 The
new rule encourages advisers to provide retirement investors with
only those recommendations in their best interest. This gives
retirement investments the protection they deserve.
A.

The Final Rule Increases Investor Protection

The final rule widens the pool of advisers and types of
advice that trigger fiduciary obligations, protecting investors
from the problems discussed in Part II, supra.196 Specifically,
the new rule will minimize the prevalence of conflicted advice
and remove investors’ confusion over when their retirement
investment advisers are their fiduciaries. The new rule also
makes advice more reliable by ensuring that advisers’ standards
of care match up with investors’ expectations. As discussed
above, under the previous regulation, some advisers were able to
receive compensation for promoting certain investments.197
Problematically, this incentivized advisers to recommend
investments that generate the most revenue to the advisers,
even if those investments would generate lower returns for the
investors.198 These conflicted payments—“payments . . . that

194 For example, when an investor must decide what to do with a 401(k) plan
upon employment termination prior to retirement.
195 See Fiduciary Duties, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012).
196 See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
197 See supra Section II.C.
198 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930.
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depend on the actions taken by the advisee”199—“encourage
investment recommendations that generate higher fees for the
advisers at the expense of their customers and often result in
lower returns for customers even before fees.”200 The DOL
enacted the final rule to restrict those conflicts of interest.201 It
accomplishes this goal by removing the five-part test for
determining when an adviser is a plan’s fiduciary.202 The fivepart test allowed advisers to remove fiduciary liability simply
by proving that one element was missing (i.e., by proving that
they did not provide advice to that client on a regular basis, or
that there was no mutual understanding that the advice would
be the primary basis for investment decisions).203 Nonfiduciary
advisers—those who were able to prove that one element of the
five-part test was absent—have limited liability for their clients’
losses. Fiduciary liability, on the other hand, holds advisers
personally liable for violating the best interest standard of
care.204 This means that they must compensate their clients
personally for any losses resulting from recommending
investments outside of their clients’ best interest. By holding
more advisers personally liable for violating the best interest
standard of care, the new rule deters advisers from providing
self-interested advice. The DOL’s Regulatory Impact Analysis
focused on the losses realized from retirement account
managers receiving conflicted payments.205 The study
concluded that if only half of the DOL’s proposed gains were
realized by retirement investors, IRA holders would gain
between $20 and $22 billion over ten years.206 The new rule’s
deterrence of conflicted advice will help investors protect their
hard-earned retirement savings.
The new rule also clears investors’ confusion about when
their retirement investment advisers have fiduciary obligations.
It accomplishes this goal by applying ERISA’s fiduciary standard
uniformly to all advisers who provide recommendations to
retirement investors. Under the previous regulatory scheme, it
was difficult for investors to know when their advisers were their
EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 4, at 6.
Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930.
201 See id.
202 The five-part test imposes fiduciary obligations on only those advisers who
(1) give advice (2) on a regular basis (3) under a mutual understanding (4) that the
advice is individualized and (5) will be the primary basis for investment decisions. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
203 See supra text accompanying note 104.
204 See supra Section I.A.
205 See Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,930–31.
206 See id.
199

200
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fiduciaries.207 This was especially confusing at times when they
were switching from ERISA-covered plans (i.e., 401(k)s) to plans
governed by the Code (i.e., IRAs). The new rule applies ERISA’s
fiduciary standard to all retirement investment accounts,
including IRAs. This removes investors’ confusion over when their
advisers are their fiduciaries. This “standards-based approach
aligns the adviser’s interests with those of the plan or IRA
customer, while leaving the adviser and employing firm the
flexibility and discretion necessary to determine how best to
satisfy these basic standards in light of the unique attributes of
their business.”208
B.

Investor Protection Outweighs the Burden on the
Investment Industry

Despite the overwhelming advantages, critics of the new
rule argue that it may increase the cost of obtaining investment
advice and reduce investors’ access to advice. Critics of the new
rule argue that middle-class investors do not invest enough
money to make it worth it to compensate advisers. The middle
class faces different retirement options than its wealthier
counterpart. In its simplest form, the problem is that small,
middle class investors have less money to invest, rendering the
task of managing their investments more expensive than
managing larger accounts. As explained above, advisers employ
two major payment schemes: a commission-based model209 and
an assets-under-management model.210 Authorities vary on
which method is most beneficial to investors.211 Typically,
however, the assets-under-management model is more
beneficial for active investors who engage in frequent trading
transactions because the yearly fee is often less than the sum
of commissions generated by frequent trading.212 On the other
hand, investors with a less diverse portfolio or those investors
See supra Section II.D.
Fiduciary Definition 2015 Proposal, supra note 3, at 21,948.
209 In a commission-based model, the investor pays a one-time commission on
each transaction the adviser performs for his investment plan. See supra Section I.A.
210 In an assets-under-management model, the investor pays the adviser a
portion of his assets under the management of the adviser (typically 1%–1.5%) each
year in exchange for the adviser’s maintenance services. See id.
211 See Fee Based Financial Advice vs. Commission: Which Choice Pays?,
FIRST EQUITABLE (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.first-equitable.com/fee-based-financialadvice-vs-commissions-which-is-the-best [https://perma.cc/SA2V-EGKM] (“The debate
over fees versus commissions, and ultimately which is best for clients, is an age-old
debate.”); Kaufman, supra note 41 (“There is no easy nor obvious answer to the feebased vs. commission-based conundrum.”).
212 See Kaufman, supra note 41.
207

208
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who do not plan to trade very frequently may benefit more from
a commission-based payment model because it would avoid
paying yearly fees for services they may not use.213
Many advisers receiving payment on an assets-undermanagement basis set minimum asset requirements for their
clients.214 In its comment letter in response to the 2015
proposal, State Farm explained that the assets-undermanagement model does not provide enough incentive for
investment advisers to manage mutual fund accounts worth less
than $22,000.215 This is because the yearly fees, based on a
portion of the amount invested,216 “will not generate sufficient
income . . . to cover the costs of the product and risk
undertaken.”217 This argument is unpersuasive because it
assumes that a commission-based payment model will be
unavailable for smaller investors. The new rule does not upend
advisers’ practice of earning commission-based compensation.
Rather, it prevents them from providing recommendations that
are not in the investor’s best interest. As long as advisers
provide only those recommendations that are in their clients’
best interest, they will face no additional liability.
The new rule broadens the definition of “investment
advice,” making many services count as investment advice that
the financial industry considers to be simple product selling.218
Providing investment advice triggers the fiduciary standard of
care, requiring advisers to recommend only those investments
in their clients’ best interest.219 Economists Robert Litan and
Hal Singer argue that middle-class investors would be harmed
through loss of access to products and advice, higher costs for
small plan services, and fewer opportunities for greater
213 See
Jason Van Bergen, Paying Your Investment Advisor—Fees or
Commissions?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/04/022704.asp
[https://perma.cc/GSH5-ARYJ].
214 See John Berlau, Don’t Let Team Obama ‘Protect’ Your Retirement Account
the Way It Has ‘Protected’ Your Health Care, FOX NEWS (July 6, 2015), http://www.
foxnews.com/opinion/2015/07/06/don-t-let-them-obamacare-your-retirement-account.
html [https://perma.cc/3YLE-449A].
215 See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Comment Letter
on Proposed Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice Under 29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509–10, at 9 (July 21, 2015), https://
www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/publiccomments/1210-AB32-2/00646.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HPU-6VHB] [hereinafter State
Farm, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal].
216 In the example of an account worth $22,000, the yearly fee at State Farm’s
typical rate of 1.48% would only generate $326 per year. See id.
217 Id.
218 See Guardian Life Insurance, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal, supra
note 76, at 7.
219 See supra Section II.A.
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retirement savings.220 Similarly, a comment letter by
Congressman Ed Perlmutter emphasized his concern that the
proposal “could lead to a decrease in affordable investment advice,
products and services” and therefore unintentionally impede
beneficiaries’ access to guaranteed lifetime income products like
annuities.221 These products and services include, for example,
State Farm’s practice of “providing consumers valuable
educational communications and access to investment
professionals with whom to discuss their individual circumstances
and investment options,”222 and “coaching to stay invested
through market downturns, and assistance in portfolio
rebalancing.”223 While it is true that the new rule may reduce
investors’ access to certain services, it should only reduce
access to recommendations outside of the investors’ best
interest. The only reduction in products and services should be
through advisers deciding not to offer those services that may
result in a recommendation to a client that is not in his best
interest. Reducing investors’ access to persuasive materials
that recommend poor investment choices will help investors
more than it will harm them.
In addition to those services, many insurance companies
also come up with algorithms and other tools of predicting
various financial calculi. In a comment letter in opposition to
the 2015 proposal, the Guardian Life Insurance Company of
America argued that its “agents typically interact with
prospective clients through the use of a proprietary data
aggregation tool[,] . . . [which] helps the agent and prospective
client gather thorough information about a prospective client’s
assets and liabilities so that together they can evaluate possible
product solutions and financial decisions.”224 The company is
concerned that the new rule renders the agent conducting that
prospective client meeting an investment advice fiduciary, even
220 See ROBERT LITAN & HAL SINGER, ECONOMISTS INC., GOOD INTENTIONS GONE
WRONG: THE YET-TO-BE RECOGNIZED COSTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S FIDUCIARY
RULE 15–23 (2015), http://www.ei.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LitanSingerFiduciary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5JYC-JKFY] (listing the harm to middle class investors as “(1)
small savers losing access to human financial advisers (because small accounts would
become uneconomic to serve, and expose advisory firms to new liability risks), (2) small
savers being forced into fee-based advisory relationships that cost more than current
commission-based arrangements, and (3) small savers and firms not being encouraged
to save more, take full advantage of employer matches, or create retirement plans in
the first place”).
221 Ed Perlmutter, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal, supra note 82.
222 State Farm, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal, supra note 215, at 13.
223 LITAN & SINGER, supra note 220, at 2.
224 Guardian Life Insurance, Comment Letter on 2015 Proposal, supra note
76, at 5.
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before any relationship has been established.225 The DOL,
however, included the education carve-out to ensure that
investors would not lose access to valuable educational materials.
It accomplishes this goal by excluding from the definition of
“recommendation” various categories of educational materials.
Asset allocation models and interactive investment materials are
important educational tools for investors.226 They help retirement
investors “connect the dots” in understanding the different
retirement options available to them.227 But critics argue that
“without the ability to include specific investment products,
participants could have a hard time understanding how the
educational materials relate to specific investment options.”228
The DOL appreciates this important concern. The final
rule allows advisers to use specific investment information in
interactive materials and asset allocation models for employee
benefits plans but not for IRAs.229 The DOL’s main concern
about particularized educational materials is that the adviser’s
selection of which particular investments to include constitutes
a recommendation, which may influence the investor’s
decision.230 But the concerns that an investor will be influenced
by an impermissible recommendation are alleviated for
employee benefit plans by the plan fiduciary’s obligation under
ERISA to monitor and oversee service providers to the plan.231
Thus, the DOL rationalizes treating employee benefit plans
differently from IRAs because of the heightened obligations of
benefit plan fiduciaries to review the selection of options.232 “[A]
responsible plan fiduciary would also have . . . an obligation to
evaluate and periodically monitor the asset allocation model
and interactive materials being made available to the plan
participants and beneficiaries as part of any education
program.”233 This obligation includes ensuring that the
materials provided to investors “are in fact unbiased and not
designed to influence investment decisions towards particular
investments that result in higher fees or compensation being

225 See id. (“An unintended consequence of the Proposal is that individuals
will lose access to the use of this beneficial tool.”).
226 See Fiduciary Definition Final Rule, supra note 6, at 20,977.
227 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
228 Id.
229 Id. at 20,978.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 Id.
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paid to” advisers.234 As such, the new rule largely preserves
investors’ access to reliable advice.
The new rule will serve to best protect those Americans
saving and investing for retirement. It will prevent expert and
cunning investment advisers from using their expertise—the
very expertise that investors are paying them for—in a way
that benefits the adviser rather than the investor. This is
imperative to remove the losses retirement investors suffer due
to receiving conflicted advice. The new rule is necessary to
protect retirement investors from being exploited for their
adviser’s financial gain.
CONCLUSION
The new fiduciary rule is crucial for investors to save for
a worry-free retirement. Under the former regulatory scheme,
the rigorous five-part test allowed many advisers to avoid
fiduciary obligations. This exposed retirement investors to
advisers with conflicting interests who were not legally
obligated to recommend only those investments in their best
interest. The new fiduciary rule broadens ERISA’s protective
provisions, requiring all retirement investor advisers to abide
by the prudent man standard of care. This protects investors
from the harmful effects of receiving conflicted advice.
Additionally, it removes investors’ confusion over when their
advisers are their fiduciaries. Investors expect their advisers to
act in their best interest. The new rule makes advice more
reliable by aligning advisers’ obligations with investors’
expectations. Requiring all retirement investment advisers to
abide by the best interest standard closely follows the broad
protections the legislature intended ERISA to afford.
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